Death of the empire. Part III.

6 Political economy of external shocks

6.1 USSR and the falling oil prices. The gist of the choice.

Insufficiently competitive machine building industry left no chances to change the structure of export trade. Cutting grain import might lead to the social crisis. Good harvests in 1986-87 allowed to soften the consequences of the falling oil prices, but in 1988 the crisis became even more threatening. The dependence of wheat harvests on the weather, caused by the developing of virgin lands in the 1950s and the low oil prices made the situation catastrophic. This was the reason of the fall of the Soviet economic system.

Possible strategies were:

• large scale raising of prices, comparable to what was done in the 1930s;
• introduction of rationing;
• lowering the production of the processing and building industries and raising the export of raw materials;
• cut capital expenditures and decrease the volume of import of machines and tools from the West.

The first option was a violation of the contract between the society and the power, formed in late 50s-early 60s and confirmed in 1962 in Novocherkassk. Besides, increased prices wouldn't solve the problem due to large forced savings of the people. The rationing opposed the existing hierarchy of distribution, even though the idea was popular (in 1991 60% of Soviet people supported this idea, while only 16% preferred growing prices). Decrease of military spendings led to the conflict with the army and the military industry. Similarly, decrease of capital expenditures led to the conflict with the regional elite and with the industrial ministries and could end with a quiet coup, like it was with Khrushchev. It was impossible to cut the industrial production in the cities, where only one factory gave jobs to the majority of the population. Cuts of the oil export to the Eastern Europe become regular. Capital expenditures and import of machinery continued to grow. A large part of the imported tools were never used, however.

The new leaders did not understand that attempts to avoid conflicts with the people or with the industrial/agricultural elite only increased the chances of the conflict with both. Traditional Soviet style of management was oriented on the natural criteria, not the financial ones. The problems of kettle farming were discussed by the government more often than the budget problems. Finances were seen as a dull accounting. Moreover, the real state of the budget was available to a very limited circle of the top officials. Gorbachev recalled: "Andropov asked me and Ryzhkov to analyse possible decisions and to report to him. Trying to get to the gist, we asked for a chance to understand the state of the budget. Andropov laughed: 'You want too much. I won't let you see it.'" Andropov himself admitted, though, that he knew next to nothing about economy.

Deintellectualization: from a protocol of the Central Committee of the CPSU: "On comrade Zasyadko: they say he has quit drinking. Send him as a minister to Ukraine." Zero economic education of the leaders.

6.2 Chain of mistakes

By 1985, the Soviet leaders did not yet understand how deep the crisis was, but they noticed the decrease of the oil production. For the 1986-1990 the plans of the capital expenditures in the oil and gas industries were by almost 1/3 larger than they had been in 1981-1985 and 3 times larger than in 1971-1975. The share of the oil and gas industries in the total amount of capital expenditures grew from 14% in the 9th five-year plan (1971-1975) to 23% in the 12th five-year plan (1986-1990). The growth of the industry was smaller than the growth of the capital expenditures.

The government did not understand that the crisis was financial and prepared two blows on the financial system: the anti-alcohol campaign and the program of the acceleration of the economic development.

In 1985, it was planned that the income from sales of alcohol should be 60 billion rubles. In 1986, the income was 38 billion rubles, in 1987 -- 35 billion rubles, in 1988 -- slightly more than 40 billion rubles.

In 1986-1988 the budget gains decreased by 31 billion rubles and the spendings grew by 36 billion rubles.

Monetary emission:

Year	Emission, billions of rubles	Emission growth, % of the previous year
1986	3.9	8.3
1987	5.9	51.3
1988	11.8	100
1989	18.3	55.1

By 1989, the government was worried by the financial situation. In January 1989 Gorbachev announced 14.2% cuts of the military spendings and 19.2% cuts of the weapons production.

The government finally understands the seriousness of the situation and decides that the conflict with the administrative elite is the lesser of the evils. However, the decisions are late and the scale of taken steps is incomparable with the scale of the crisis.

6.3 Growing problems of the Soviet economy

The oil production began to decrease again. From time to time various goods disappear from the shops: sugar, toothpaste, soap, washing powder, school copybooks, batteries, not to mention meat, shoes, etc. The 1987 program of economic reforms was buried. The control over the monetary mass and the people's incomes was lost.

Incomes of the citizens grow by 12.9% instead of the planned 1.2% and they grow 1.4 times faster than the expenses. In the beginning of 1990 the unsatisfied demand was 110 billion rubles against 60 billion rubles in 1986. The Central Bank issues more and more credits to the state budget.

Grain production falls and the prices on the world market grow. It's getting difficult to buy meat, butter, sweets, sugar, tea, flour, cereals, fruits and vegetables, fish, cigarettes. The supply of fabrics, shoes, children's stockings, school copybooks, wood, construction materials, matches is sharply decreasing.

By the end of 1989 the Soviet leaders are fully aware of the problems. Western banks are worried by the growth of the USSR's debt. Soviet Union cannot pay for the imported goods and the shipments stop. The credits issued earlier by the USSR to the satellite states are hopeless.

Especially dangerous was the situation with the medicine. The Soviet industry could provide only 40-45% of the necessary drugs. Supplies from abroad are stopping.

6.4 Currency crisis

Western banks refuse to issue new credits. In 1988, the income from the exported goods was only 54% of the planned amount. In 1986-88, more than one million complaints about poor quality of the exported goods were received. The debt is two times as large as the income from the export. Even in the trade with the socialist countries import exceeds export. All income from the export is spent on the debt payments.

Foreign banks refer to their governments. The Western countries tie new credits with the economic reforms and the delimitation of the authority of the central governments and the republics.

6.5 Economical and political liberalization against the background of financial problems

The first known official document where the necessity and possibility of keeping the political system was questioned is the letter of Alexander Yakovlev to Gorbachev written in December of 1985: "Today the problem is not in the economy. The political system is the key. Hence the necessity of full and consistent democratism. Democracy is, first of all, freedom of choice. We have no choice, only centralization. Now, we don't understand the ongoing historically inevitable transformation of the time when there was no choice to the time when successful development is impossible without the democratic process of choice which would involve every citizen."

On September 25, 1986, chairman of KGB Chebrikov offers to set free one third of the Soviet political prisoners and then extends the proposal to one half. Magazines begin publishing banned texts.

The liberalization per se canot quell financial crises. And yet, the liberalization started in 1987 heavily influenced the collapse of the Soviet economy.

Ways to modernize Soviet economy were discussed since 1960s. However, the ideas of its radical reconstruction were under ban till mid-80s. The phrase "market economy" (even "socialist market economy") were never applied to the USSR. The word "reform" was not used since early 70s till Gorbachev first uttered it in 1986.

Free prices are a necessary requisite of the market economy, even the socialist one. Market mechanisms do not work without free prices, as the Polish experience of 70s-80s had demonstrated: autonomy of the enterprises gives no stimuli to the effective production under fixed prices.

On November 11, 1986 the law on individual labour was adopted. On May 1, 1987 individual farming was legalized. Unfortunately, unlike in China, these measures gave no results in 1988 because of lack of trust to the government: the Soviet people were sure that the announced reforms will never be realized.

Enterprises demanded for more autonomy, but insist on the guaranteed supply of tools and materials from the state.

The idea of the workers' participation in the management of the enterprise was discussed in the early XX century, before the revolution of 1917, and the Soviet leaders did not reject it completely. In 1962, Khrushchev said: "Probably, we should have some kind of a council at the enterprises, and the director will make a report at the council monthly or quarterly. I can imagine that the council will elect the director from a number of candidates."

Autonomous enterprises raise salary for the workers. Labour discipline suffers.

In May 1988, the law on cooperation is adopted. Cooperatives buy products for fixed prices, process them (or not) and sell for fre prices. 80% of cooperatives were organized on the state enterprises. Average salary in the cooperatives is 2 times higher than on the state enterprises.

Decrees of July 6 and August 4 allow the VLKSM (communist youth league) to go to business, giving a chance to the elite to use the comsomol resources for commerce.

A large number of commercial banks are organized. Many of them violate the laws and regulations on banking. Soviet leaders do not understand that the liberalization of banking should be one of the last, but not the first stage of the economy transformation.

In 1989 miners' strikes begin. They demand for better food supply. The government promises to increase the supplies, but cannot fulfil the promises. Salary is payed regularly, but the money get devalued fast.

7 Developing crisis of the socialist economical and political systems

Death of the empire. Part II.

3 Causes of the instability of authoritarian regimes

3.1 Instability

The cause of instability of authoritarian regimes is the lack of legitimacy and primitive structure of the state.

One option to fight the challenges of instability in authoritarian regimes is the closed, or managed, democracy, when de jure democratic institutions and procedures are retained, but the ruling elite establishes principles of the continuity of power, controls elections and determins their results. This is a dead end (see Italy, Japan, Mexico).

Another option is the formation of totalitarian structures. Authoritarian states want their citizens to stay aside of public politics, avoid demonstrations and rallies, not contact foreign press, etc. On the other hand, totalitarian regimes control the private life of citizens. A messian-type ideology is typical for totalitarism.

3.2 Mechanisms of the fall of authoritarianism

Crisis of legitimacy, lack of trust (even among police and army). Opposition can use simple slogans (re-distribution, nationalism) which are difficult to refute.

Nothing guarantees, however, that the fall of an authoritarian regime results in the creation of stable democracy. External influences are important here. In Eastern Europe: influence of the EU, chances to become a member of EU. In Latin America: influence of USA.

4 The oil curse.

4.1 Resource wealth and economic development.

There is a reverse proportion between long-term economic growth and the amount of natural resources.

Abundance of natural resources gives the ruling classes a way to increase budget not caring about the increase of taxes, that is without a dialogue with the society. Since only such dialogues allow to build the rules of the political play and launch modern mechanisms of the economic growth, there are less limitations on corruption and arbitrariness in the countries with rich resources.

The distribution of profit in resource-rich countries depends on the experience in bribery, not on the market mechanisms.

Resource wealth increases risks of political instability, connected with the struggle for the re-distribution of profits.

A typical feature of resource-rich countries is lack of attention towards problems of education. Probably, due to the specific demand for work force in the mining companies and other companies producing raw materials.

Highly volatile prices on raw materials are a problem for the economy of such countries.

4.2 Specific features of the oil market

When most market players believe that the oil prices will stay high for a short period only, they will stay so. When the opinion prevails that the high prices are a new stable level for a long period, the prices will fall

4.3 Regulation of the oil market in the XX century

Market was split in 1928 by 7 largest corporation -- agreement of Achnacarry. Cannon boat diplomacy, exploitation of less developed countries.

1960 -- OPEC.

1974 -- oil crisis, growing prices. Decrease of oil consumption in the importing countries led to the decrease of demand in 1981 and the sharp fall of prices in 1986.

4.4 Challenges linked with the fall of the raw materials prices: Mexico and Venezuela.

Mexico. Was a closed democracy in 1970-1990. Share of the state expenses in the GNP was growing. The foreign debt increased. When the prices fell -- tax growth, budget expenses cut, currency devaluation.

Venezuela. Stable democracy. Control over the growth of the national currency rate. Populists come to power in 1974. By 1989 Venezuela has 84% inflation and the foreign debt equal to 54% of GNP. Labor productivity falls. Defaulted foreign debt. Chavez comes to power in 1992.

4.5 Response to the threats of the prices volatility

Hedging and forward contracts are political risks for the government. Two kinds of stabilization funds: protection of the national economy from the oscillation of prices and the fund for future generations.

In the non-democratic countries there is high risk of corruption in the stabilization fund management and/or ineffective investments.

Stabilization funds are an easy target for the opposition in democratic countries. Even in Norway, under effective democracy, a coalition in power never won the elections since the stabilization fund was created.

5 Crevices in the foundation. USSR in early 1980s

5.1 Ineffectiveness in stability

Social stability is the typical feature of the Brezhnev's epoch. 7 out of 9 mass protests against the regime took place in the first years of Brezhnev's rule. In 1969-1977 there were none. In the times of Khrushchev, the government used armed troops against the discontent in 8 cases out of 11. In the years of Brezhnev's rule -- only in 3 cases out of 9. Since 1968 till Brezhnev's death weapon was never used against the protesters.

Mass construction of living buildings (instead of earlier "communal apartments") and personal garden-plots (dachas) for growing vegetables and fruits resulted in loss of the total control over the personal life of the citizens.

Changes of the information field. In 1950 only 2% of Soviet people had radio receivers with short wave bands. By 1980 -- 50%. From a KGB report of 1976: "A significant share of the persons who committed politically harmful misdemeanours were under foreign ideological influence. The main factor was propaganda by radio. 80% of university students and 90% of undergraduate schoolchildren listen foreign radiostations regularly (32% of univesity students and 59% of schoolchildren listen them 1-2 times a week and even more often." A report of 1970: "5 years ago most of illegal printed materials were ideologically vicious fiction books, but now we see widely popular political documents and programs. Since 1965 we were aware of about 400 books and articles which criticize the historical experience of building of communist in the USSR, revising the politics of the CPSU, offering oppositional political programs."

5.2 Growing problems and wrong solutions

1930s-1950s -- redistribution of labour resources from rural areas to the cities. In 1960s the flow of labour force decreased.

1965: more rights given to the factories and other enterprises, the salary now depends not only on the personal input, but also on the financial results of the whole enterprise.

Ineffectiveness of Soviet system: USSR produced 8 times more iron ore than the USA, made of this ore 3 times more cast iron, which was processed into 2 times more steel. From this steel the same amount of tools and machines was produced. Consumption of raw materials and energy per a production unit was 1.6 and 2.1 times more correspondingly.

After the chemical weapons were prohibited, the factories involved into this production had to be used somehow. Millions of people became victims of food contaminated with insecticides and other poisons.

The command system of management created in 1930s-1950s was based on fear of severe punishment. After Stalin's death in 1953 the discipline quickly falls.

Alcohol. The share of alcohol consumed in socially controlled places (restaurants, caffees, etc.) was 5.5% vs. 50-70% in developed countries. In 20 years consumption of alcohol grew 2.2 times, number of crimes committed under alcohol intoxication grew 5.7 times, the number of people suffering from alcoholism -- 7 times.

Loss of the effectivity of the communist ideology. The ideological dogmata were not taken as seriously as before. They were either dismissed or ridiculed out. Deintellectualization of the CPSU led to gerontocracy.

5.3 Problems of the food supply

Socialism is the economy of deficit. Since late 1960s shortages grow. In late 1980s shortages turned into a crisis.

The problem of the food supply of the cities was faced by the tsarist government before the WWI. The revolution was a corollary. Bolsheviks solved the problem with prodrazvyorstka (food expropriation). In the late 1920s the problem became important again. Stalin's solution was chosen: dekulakization, collectivization, prodrazvyorstka.

In Europe the period of the industrial growth was preceded by the agrarian revolution (sharp growth of the effectivity of the agriculture). In Russia, the agrarian revolution never happened, but the agriculture grew steadily and the country was the largest exporter of food.

Collectivization and deprivation of kolkhoz members of their right to choose the place to live and work, nonfree non-payed work were equal to restoration of serfdom, but now the state from one of the exploiters became the only one. Hence, the labour ethics distorts: work becomes a burden to avoid.

Social position of the peasants was intentionally low. Annual income of a kolkhoz member was close to a monthly salary of a factory worker. The socialist model created motives for the smartest and the most energetic peasants to move to a city, in spite of the bans to do so.

5.4 Food shortage: strategic challenge

Options: additional investments in the traditional agricultural regions, Nechernozemye (non-Black Soil Belt); developing of virgin lands; liberalization and de-collectivization. The first option was proved to be ineffective later in 1970s-1980s. The second option was chosen, in spite of the predicted instability of the harvest.

After 1958 growth of harvests stops. In 1963 the harvest was significantly lower than before. In 1953-1960 the reserves of grain decrease. Capital expenditures grow. Social degradation led to the low effectiviness of agriculture. Since 1971 till 1985 capital expenditures were 579.6 billion rubles. The result was zero.

5.5 USSR as the largest food importer

Contrary to the market economy, in the socialist economy it was impossible to raise the retail prices, it would be a violation of the social contract between the state and the people. The rulers, caring primarily of their own security, rejected the use of terror, typical for the earlier years and the fear of the state decreased among the general population. Now the neglection of social programs led to the conflicts, like in Novocherkassk in 1962. From a KGB order: "In the first half of 1962 7705 anti-Soviet leaflets were registered, two times more than in the first half of 1961. After the prices were raised, the flow increased. Only in June there were 83 occasions of different anti-Soviet leaflets and graffiti. In the same period, more than 300 anti-Soviet anonymous letters received by the party and Soviet organizations and newspapers were reported to KGB. In these letters, people express their discontent with the low quality of life, and call to mass protests, strikes, rallies, boycotts demanding for the increase of salary and decrease of prices."

Growth of forced savings (the people could not find goods to spend the money and had to save them): 1970 -- 17.5 billion rubles, 1980 -- 29 billion rubles, 1985 -- 60.9 billion rubles.

Eventually, the prices grow even in the socialist economy. In 1981-85 prices on bread grew by 6.6%, on potato -- by 7.9%, on cotton fabrics -- by 17.9%, on TVs -- by 10%. In 1979 prices on luxury goods grew: on gold -- by 50%, on silver -- by 95%, on fur -- by 50%, on carpets -- by 50%, on cars -- by 18%.

Non-equal and unjust distribution of goods: in Moscow and Leningrad 97% of people bought food in the state shops (the prices there were lower than on the markets where kolkhoz members sold their product), in the capitals of Soviet republics -- 79%, in oblast centres -- 36%. The higher was the income of a family, the better access to cheaper food they had.

Grain supplies to the socialist countries. Only in 1963 the grain crisis forces the USSR to stop the supplies to the socialist countries and to buy wheat abroad. One third of the gold reserve was spent on wheat (372.2 tons of gold). In 1965 -- 335.5 tons more. In 1907-1913 Russia was the largest exporter of grain (45% of the world market). By 1980s USSR became the largest importer (16.4% of the world market). There is not enough gold to buy grain and the industry is not competitive to increase export of machines. Hence, USSR takes credits.

5.6 Oil of the West Siberia. Illusion of rescue

Year	Production of oil in the Western Siberia, mln.tons
1965	1
1966	2.8
1967	5.8
1968	12.2
1969	21.3
1970	31.4
1971	44.7
1972	62.7
1973	87.7
1974	116.4
1975	148.0
1976	181.7
1977	218.3
1978	254.1
1979	283.5
1980	312.6
1981	334.3
1982	352.9
1983	370.1
1984	377.9

Increase of oil production and the growth of oil prices in 1973-74 and in 1979-81 gave a chance to stop the food crisis, to increase import of machines and tools, consumers goods, provided the financial base of the arms race, allowed to achieve parity of nuclear weapons with the USA and to start the campaigns like the war in Afghanistan.

Being certain that the high prices on oil are stable, USSR did not create any financial reserves and borrowed additional foreign credits. In 1979-1981 three successive low harvests result in the deficit of the foreign trade. In 1980s oil prices stop growing. Shortage of consumer goods increases, monetary emission grows, retail prices grow. Shortage of food is compensated with their lowering quality (like decreasing percentage of meat in sausage, etc.). Since mid-1970s about one half of the trade growth was produced by lowering quality of goods and increased prices. The report was prepared and given to the chairman and the vice-chairmen of the Council of ministers, but it was confiscated and destroyed on the next day.

In 1982 the government of Poland asks for assistance. in 1980-81 the financial aid was 4 billion rubles. In 1982-83 an additional 2.7 billion rubles credit was issued.

5.7 Falling oil prices: the last strike

Autumn 1981: oil supplies to the Eastern Europe are cut by 10%. In 1985 oil production begins to decrease. Supplies to the Eastern Europe continue, but the export to the West decreases. In 1984 the Academy of Sciences predicts stabilization of the oil prices, but in 1985 they plunge.

5.8 Dissolution of the USSR: unexpected and logical

In the 1970s-80s nobody foresaw the fall of the USSR. The opinion of the daemonic omnipotence of CIA and its role in the fall of the USSR, so widespread in modern Russia, is a mirrored reflection of the point of view prevailing in Washington that in the late 80s-early 90s the CIA demonstrated extreme incompetence in everything related to the USSR and Russia.

The second version of what caused the dissolution of the USSR is the intensification of the arms race, imposed by Reagan. It is impossible to estimate the real scale of military spendings in the USSR, the data are irreconcilable. Besides, it is not clear whether the prices on military equipment were based on the economic reality in any degree. To understand whether this version is valid, one should understand how the decisions were made in the USSR. The evidences that the USSR increased military spendings since early 1980s are not convincing enough. The volume of military production was not determined by the necessities and military plans, but by the available industrial units.

Gorbachev's aide Shakhnazarov once asked: "Why should we produce so much weapons?" The General Staff commander Akhromeyev replied: "Because we have built first class factories, not worse than what the American have. Would you order them to produce tin pans?"

From the military and strategic point of view, the Western experts who monitored the production of tanks in the USSR, could only conlude that the Soviets plan an offensive war. In reality, the occasion behind this decision was the certainty that should the war with the USA begin, Americans will quickly raise the production of tanks, and the losses of Soviet tanks in the first stage of war will be extremely high. The main cause, however, was that the factories were built and the workers must have job to do. The same happened to the SS-20 missiles. The decision to produce them inevitably led to the reaction of the West -- placement of missiles in the Western Europe and increase of the threat to the USSR. After all, USSR had to agree to cut the number of missiles, when huge resources had already been spent.

By 1985 the roots of a deep crisis were already prepared in the USSR. The Soviet authorities were still sure in the stability of the Soviet economy. When the new leaders came to power, it took about three years to understand the situation. But it was already too late.

Death of the empire. Part I.

1 Foreword

1.1 Post-imperial syndrome in Russia

Empire is a strong polyethnical state, where the power is concentrated in the metropolitan country, and the democratic institutes (if any) or, at least, the suffrage, are not available on the whole controlled territory.

The problem of the country ill with the post-imperial syndrome is that the feeling of the nostalgy to the lost empire is easy to incite, but the attempts to restore it are unrealistic.

Many Germans forgot how they hated the monarchy in the last years of the first World War, when it became clear that the chancellor and the highest officials lied to them. They didn't know that it was Ludendorf who demanded the new chancellor to sign the truce to avoid the catastrophe on the Western front.

That the leaders of the Weimar republic were not ready to disclose the proofs of the responsibility of the German rulers for the beginning of the World War was one of the most important causes of the fall of the republic.

I. Yakovenko: "Not a single political force in Russia dared to admit that from the viewpoint of preservation and restoration of the Russian people the dissolution of the USSR became the luckiest event of the last half of the century."

The importance of the agreements in Belovezhskaya Pushcha should not be overestimated. They were only a de jure recognition of the divorce that had already happened. They did not make the fall of the integrated empire any less painful, but helped to avoid the chances of bloody conflicts and the nuclear catastrophe. As a result of these agreements, by May 1992 the largest part of the most dangerous (due to the specific of usage) tactical nuclear weapons located in other republics, was concentrated in Russia.

The Soviet government was absolutely convinced that the state can use unlimited violence to suppress the discontent. Such states are fragile since they do not include flexible adaptive mechanisms which would allow for the adaptation to the changing world.

The following picture dominates the modern Russian public opinion:

1. 20 years ago there was a stable, powerful, developing country, the USSR.
2. Strange people (probably, agents of foreign intelligence) began political and economical reforms.
3. The results of the reforms were catastrophic.
4. In 1999-2000 the people who really care about the state came to the power.
5. Since then, the life is getting better.

This myth is as far from the truth as the legend of the unconquered and betrayed Germany, popular in the German society of 20s-30s.

2 Greatness and fall of the empires.

2.1 Empires of the past

The European empires were formed in the age of the mercantilist politics. The states limited import and stimulated export. Possession of colonies increased the zone of controlled trade. Subjugated countries could not regulate the import of goods from the metropolitan state. Administrative coercion -- an element of the politics for the industrial development of the metropolitan state. In 1813 India could sell goods in Britain for prices 50-60% lower than the prices on the analogous Britain-made goods. The customs duties (70-80%) or direct bans made this impossible. The colonization was followed by the loss of job by hundreds of thousands of people. The population of Dakka decreased from 150,000 to 30-40,000 people. Between 1814 and 1835 export of British textile to India grew from 1 million to 51 million yards per year. In the same years, export from India to Britain decreased by four times. By 1844 it decreased by 5 times.

A typical feature of all empires is the lack of universal suffrage.

National sentiments are one of the strongest instruments of political mobilization in the societies lacking democratic traditions. K. Leontyev: "The notion of nationalities as it exists in the XIX century brings a lot of destructive consequences and nothing constructive."

2.2 Crisis of the overseas empires

Churchill, Nov 10 1942: "We plan to hold what is our property. I did not become the prime minister to preside during the liquidation of the British empire."

Having survived the fall of the empire, France retained democratic institutions in the metropolitan state due to a number of causes: high level of economy, which makes authoritarian regimes look archaic; plans of the European integration; prestige and will of de Gaulle who was able to dissolve the empire and retain the control over the army and police.

2.3 Problems of the dissolution of integrated empires

In agrarian countries ethnic differences usually are not important. The split into a privileged minority specialized in coercion and the peasants' majority was crucial.

Economic growth and education radically change the life and begin the erosion of traditional regimes.

An overseas empire may be abandoned. In the empires with integrated territory the problems linked with the habitats of various ethnic groups are more important than in the overseas empires.

The fall of an authoritarian regime is followed by a political vacuum. The old policeman has gone, the new one is not here yet. People with pretensions of power have no tradition behind them. Hence a situation typical for revolutions: weak government is unable to collect taxes and pay money, establish order, guarantee contract obligations. In such situations the exploitation of the simplest social instincts is a reliable way to political success.

Attempts of the elite of the metropolitan states to build the state on the basis of ethnic identity objectively cause radical anti-imperial sentiments among the national minorities. E.g.: "In the struggle of the Ukrainian separatism with a more moderate federalism the former had the same powerful assistant as other Russian separatisms -- the imperial centralism. Its hardcore unitarian position pushed the Ukrainians to equally hard demands." (A. Vishnevsky)

H. Besançon: Before the WWI Russia had a chance to solve social and economic problems, but not the national ones. The liberal democratic alternative, which was the key to the solution of the social problems, only increased the chances of the dissolution of the empire. The restoration of the empire in 1918-1922 was a unique case, which became possible due to the unprecendented violence and the messian ideology which provided for support in the non-Russian regions.

In the situation of the political competition in the multinational empire, Austrian socialists understood that the national question is a bomb in the foundation of the old power. Lenin's idea of the right of nations on self-determination was a logical development of the logic of Austrian socialists.

After the WWI the idea was accepted by the winner countries as an instrument of dismantl of the three empires -- Germany, Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman empire.

The notion of self-determination gives no answer whether the arbitrary borders of regions within empires should become the natural borders of new states, whether the will of the new national minorities should be taken into account.

2.4 The Yugoslav tragedy

S. Woodword: "The Yugoslav society was not based on the charisma of Tito or on the political dictatorship, but on the balance of international interests and on the system of rights of sovereign parts. The national identity was not suppressed. Moreover, it was institutionalized into federal systems which guaranteed the rights of the republics." Such system required a strict control over the dissidence.

The stability of Yugoslavia was the result of a balance between NATO and the Warsaw block. The fall of the Comecon (The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) caused an economic crisis, which required strict measures, but the minimal rights of the federal centre led to the political crisis. For Milośević, the only way to retain control over Serbia under the erosion of the communist ideology was to exploit nationalism. The answer to this rhetorics was the discrimination of Serbs in other republics. Then the troops were sent there to protect the Serbs. Then -- the war.

Book: Death of the empire by Yegor Gaidar

I have finished reading a book written by ex-prime minister of Russia, Yegor Gaidar. The book is titled "Death of the Empire". Being a good economist, Gaidar explains the fall of the USSR by economic reasons. Some key quotations are:

"The dependence of wheat harvests on the weather, caused by the developing of virgin lands in the 1950s and the low oil prices made the situation catastrophic. This was the reason of the fall of the Soviet economic system."

"The Soviet government was absolutely convinced that the state can use unlimited violence to suppress the discontent. Such states are fragile since they do not include flexible adaptive mechanisms which would allow for the adaptation to the changing world."

"[The actions of the current Russian government] form a way to the system which may be called a closed (or managed) democracy, or soft authoritarianism. This system has little common features with the Soviet totalitarian system, but it begins to show weaknesses and elements of instability typical for such systems... However, the remaining elements of freedom and flexibility still give some hope for Russia. "

While reading the book, I made some short (well, not so short, as it turned out :)) notes and I plan to translate them into English and post here. Below is the table of contents of the book.

• 1 Foreword
  • 1.1 Post-imperial syndrome in Russia.
• 2 Greatness and fall of the empires.
  • 2.1 Empires of the past
  • 2.2 Crisis of the overseas empires
  • 2.3 Problems of the dissolution of integrated empires
  • 2.4 The Yugoslav tragedy
• 3 Causes of the instability of authoritarian regimes
  • 3.1 Instability
  • 3.2 Mechanisms of the fall of authoritarianism
• 4 The oil curse.
  • 4.1 Resource wealth and economic development.
  • 4.2 Specific features of the oil market
  • 4.3 Regulation of the oil market in the XX century
  • 4.4 Challenges linked with the fall of the raw materials prices: Mexico and Venezuela.
  • 4.5 Response to the threats of the prices volatility
• 5 Crevices in the foundation. USSR in early 1980s
  • 5.1 Ineffectiveness in stability
  • 5.2 Growing problems and wrong solutions
  • 5.3 Problems of the food supply
  • 5.4 Food shortage: strategic challenge
  • 5.5 USSR as the largest food importer
  • 5.6 Oil of the West Siberia. Illusion of rescue
  • 5.7 Falling oil prices: the last strike
  • 5.8 Dissolution of the USSR: unexpected regularity
• 6 Political economy of external shocks
  • 6.1 USSR and the falling oil prices. The gist of the choice.
  • 6.2 Chain of mistakes
  • 6.3 Growing problems of the Soviet economy
  • 6.4 Currency crisis
  • 6.5 Economical and political liberalization against the background of financial problems
• 7 Developing crisis of the socialist economical and political systems
  • 7.1 Problems of the oil industry
  • 7.2 Political credits
  • 7.3 Price of the compromises
  • 7.4 Crisis of the empire and the national question
  • 7.5 Loss of control
  • 7.6 From crisis to catastrophe
  • 7.7 "Extraordinary efforts" instead of reforms
  • 7.8 On the edge of default
• 8 On the road to the state bankruptcy
  • 8.1 Currency crisis. 1991
  • 8.2 Grain problem
  • 8.3 Prices fly upwards
  • 8.4 Money and the fate of the empire
• 9 The end
  • 9.1 Political economy of the failed coup
  • 9.2 Political agony
  • 9.3 Political desintegration: political consequences
  • 9.4 Civilized divorce
• 10 Afterword

Russian history 38. First Lithuanian knyazes

As we have seen (see chapters 35 and 37), in the XIII century Lithuanian tribes, pushed by the Germans, began to form unions and groups around Lithuanian and Russian knyazes. Knyaz Mindaugas (or Mindovg) became the leader of the unification process. Having captured Russian town Novgorodok (or Novogrodek) on the upper Neman river, he spread his power to a part of Lithuanian tribes and some Russian provinces: Polotsk, Vitebsk and partially Smolensk. He used Lithuanians to occupy Russian lands and he used Russians to spread his influence among lesser Lithuanian knyazes. During all his rule, he opposed Germans with the united Lithuanian-Russian forces. He was the first knyaz who attempted to reconcile earlier hostile Lithuanians and Russians. When he felt it was useful, he agreed to accept baptisement from the Germans and received the royal crown from the Pope. When the situation changed, he returned to the paganism and attacked Germans again. His Russian politics was also flexible. So, after many conquests, when Daniil Romanovich of Galich proved to be a strong enemy, Mindaugas ceded some lands to Daniil and his daughter became wife of Daniil's son, Shvarn. In spite of this flexibility, Mindaugas was killed by Lithuanian knyazes in 1263. His son, Voishelk revenged and killed many of the assassins. One of them, Dovmont, fled to Pskov, baptised, became the knyaz of Pskov and successfully defended the city from the attacks of Germans and Lithuanians.

After the death of Mindaugas the Lithuanian state declined. Only 50 years later the power of the knyzes becomes stronger again, when knyaz Gediminas forms a new strong state from Lithuanian and Russian lands. In the times of Gediminas Lithuanian got new cities, well planned and fortified. The army is well equipped and trained. These enhancements were the result of Russian influence. Russians serve in the army and command it, they become the ambassadors of Gediminas, they run cities and provinces. Gediminas and his children were married on Russian women, Russian language was widely spoken in his country. He thought of himself as of a both Lithuanian and Russian knyaz and titled himself "Rex Litwinorum Ruthenorumque". This policy led to the unification of south-western Russian lands from Polotsk to Kiev in Gediminas' Lithuania. First, he ruled his country from the inaccessible castle in Trakai, located on an island in the middle of a lake. Later, he built a new capital on river Vilia, a tributary of Neman, called Vilnius.

Russians eagerly became citizens of this semi-Russian country and the dynasty of Gediminas managed to form the centre, which attracted all south-western Rus, which had lost its unity earlier.

Two sons of Gediminas, Olgerdas and Kestutis, ruled Lithuania together. Retaining friendly relations, they shared the power: Olgerdas knew the Russian part of the population, lived in Vilnius and fought with the north-eastern Rus. Kestutis lived in Trakai and opposed Germans. So, Russians knew Olgerdas better than his brother. They praised his talents, saying that he ruled "by wisdom, not by force". Germans, on the other hand, knew Kestutis better and spoke of him as of a knight, brave, honest and merciful. On the one hand, the brothers withstood the German attacks and on the other hand, they continued to adjoin Russian lands. The Germans were stopped and Olgerdas took Chernigov, Bryansk, Kiev, Volyn. He even attempted to increase his influence in Novgorod and Pskov and supported Tver in their struggle against Moscow. Moscow, though, was already so strong in the north-eastern Rus that managed to stop Olgerdas.

Olgerdas and Kestutis liberated southern and western Rus from Mongols and united these lands under one rule. It was very important that this power belonged to the Russian culture. From the viewpoint of the Russians, the sons of Gediminas restored the Russian culture in the traditionally Russian areas, along Dnieper. However, the following events proved they were wrong.

Russian history: part 3

After a short time-out, we're starting the third part. It will include the following chapters:

Birth and growth of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania

• 38: First Lithuanian dukes
• 39: Union of Lithuania and Poland. Jogaila
• 40: Vytautas
• 41: Lithuanian duchy after Vytautas

Birth and growth of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy

• 42: Reasons for the rise of Moscow
• 43: Grand knyaz Ivan Kalita and his successors
• 44: Dimitri Donskoy and the battle of Kulikovo field
• 45: Grand knyazes Vasily I Dimitrievich and Vasily II Vasilyevich the Dark

Formation of the Great Russian state

• 46: Grand knyaz Ivan III Vasilyevich, importance of his rule
• 47: Subjugation of Novgorod the Great and the Novgorod lands
• 48: Joining the appanage duchies
• 49: Family and court of Ivan III
• 50: Foreign policy of Ivan III: Mongols
• 51: Foreign policy of Ivan III: Lithuania and Livonia. Relations with the West
• 52: Grand knyaz Vasily III Ivanovich

Transformation of the appanages into state

• 53: The autocracy of the rulers of Muscovy and Moscow as the third Rome
• 54: Boyars and knyazhata: their ambitions
• 55: Classes: landlords and peasants
• 56: Church as a landlord.

Sunken ships in the Baltic sea

In 2002, a group of Russian archaeologists launched a project called Secrets of Sunken Ships (Russian version: Тайны затонувших кораблей). They write:

Today our aim is the search, exploration, fixation and state registration of the whole complex of the objects reflecting the history of Northern Europe for minimum 1,400 years. But it is possible that in course of the operations and appearance of more and more discoveries our investigations will turn into the largest exposition and research project in the sphere of history which is capable of providing the scientists and society with a huge volume of new information.

Now, the web-site features a brief review of the history of Russian presence on the Baltic Sea, description of the programs of the project, catalogue and map of identified objects (buildings, necropoles, stone labyrinthes, bombs, tanks, airplanes and, of course, ships and boats). Russian version has also a video-archive, list of national and international laws on the underwater explorations, list of known and still not rescued treasures and some other sections which will eventually appear in the English version, too.

In this year, the expedition of the project found 9 ships in the Gulf of Finland. Among the most interesting finds are a Dutch XVIII century cargo ship, a Finnish patrol ship, sunken in 1944 and, the best of all, Russian 20 cannon sloop-of-war Svir', sistership of the famous Mirny, a ship of the famous expedition of Bellinsgauzen and Lazarev, the discoverers of the Antarctica. Svir' sank in autumn 1824, when she went home from topographical works in the Gulf of Finland. Sudden storm threw the ship onto the stones. The crew was rescued, but what happened to the ship remained unknown until this year.

September 5 in Russian history

1919: Vasily Ivanovich Chapayev, the best known commander of the Red Army, was killed during the night raid of the White Army near town Lbischensk (now Chapayev) on river Ural in Kazakhstan. He was born in a poor family and his early years are not documented, so his biography is hopelessly incomplete, in spite of (and, in part, due to) the efforts of the Soviet historians. He was born in 1887 in village Budayka (now a part of the city Cheboksary), in the family of a carpenter, who never had enough money and moonlighted as a cabman. In 1897 they moved to Balakovo in Samara province (now in Saratov oblast). In 1908 Vasily returned to Budayka and married 16-year old Pelageia Metlina. They had three children. In 1915-16 he fought in the Western Ukraine and Romania, was wounded three times, became a sergeant-major, was awarded with St.George crosses and the St.George medal 4th class. In the end of the war, when soldiers were allowed to elect their commanders, he was elected the commander of the 138th regiment, which was located near Saratov. In 1917, Chapayev visited his wife, took his children and brought them into the house of his parents. When his friend Pyotr Kamishkertsev was killed, Chapayev took two his children into his own family. When in spring 1918 the Civil war began on Volga and Ural, the regiment joined the Red Army and fought against cossacks.

Chapayev was a gifted, charismatic and lucky commander. His friends recalled that he often read books about famous military leaders of the past: Hannibal, Suvorov, Napoleon. In September 1918, a division under his commandment defeated the Czech Legion and the troops of the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly. Then the division moved towards Uralsk and participated in the battle for this city. In November 1918, Chapayev was sent to the training courses of the General Staff of the Red Army. In January 1919 he left to Samara. Mikhail Frunze, a bolshevik military leader, highly estimated Chapayev's talents and appointed him the commander of the 25th division. This division defeated consequently 5 White divisions and captured Ufa. After this, the division was sent to the south, where they took Uralsk. On September 5, cossacks suddenly attacked the division headquarters locate near Lbischensk at night. According to the investigation held soon after his death, Chapayev drowned trying to cross river Ural being wounded. Some of his comrades said that he was lethally wounded, taken across the river by the soldiers and buried there. Since the area is now flooded, it's impossible to check this version.

In 1923, Dmitri Furmanov, ex-commisar in Chapayev's division, wrote a book Chapayev, which was made into a movie in 1934. The Soviets turned Chapayev into an icon of the Civil war and grew from a rather modest commander to a half-mythical figure. As a reaction to this hype, the people turned him and his friends, commissionaire Pyotr Isayev (Petka) and machine-gunner Maria Potapova (Anka) into characters of innumerable jokes, like this one: Petka asks Chapayev, "Why didn't you enter the military academy?", "You see, Petka, they asked me who is Caesar and I replied that this is a stallion from the second squadron." "Hey, of course, they couldn't take you! We transferred him to the fourth squadron while you were away!". Or another one: the Whites encircled the Reds. Chapayev hid in a barrel and Petka was caught. When the Whites were taking Petka to the execution, he kicked the barrel and said: "Get out, Vasily Ivanovich, we're betrayed!"

Since the body of Chapayev was never found, a lot of rumors appeared after his death. Most of them said that he had escaped, but was so ashamed of the blunder he made when set no guards around the headquarters, that he drank for a week or two and then came to Frunze. Frunze said: "You fight better as a legend than as a commander," or "We need you dead more than we needed you alive," or anything like that. Then Chapayev was either executed or sent to exile. Just legends.

Probably, more things were named after Chapayev than after any other person: villages and cities (a city near Samara was named Trotsk in 1927, but was renamed to Chapayevsk in 1929 when Trotsky turned out to be an enemy), ships and kolhozes, board games and computer games, cartoons and novels... The board game Chapayevtsy is similar to some games of the peoples of the world: you take a chess board and 16 checkers (8 for each player) and flick your checkers trying to push the enemy checkers away from the board. However, the Russian version has two immense advantage over other versions: first, it's played on a chess board (don't ask me why), and second, you can start playing checkers and, whenever you feel you're loosing, switch to Chapayevtsy.

1944: Government of the USSR proclaims the state of war with Bulgaria. In 1934, a pro-fascist dictatorship was established in Bulgaria by tsar Boris. In 1939, Bulgaria proclaimed neutrality in the World War, but continued to develop close ties with Germany and Italy. In 1940, Hitler forced Romania to sign the treaty of Craiova and to return the region of Southern Dobrudja, which was transferred from Bulgaria to Romania in 1913. This treaty was supported by USSR and Great Britain. USSR proposed an alliance to Bulgaria, offering to support the territorial claims to Greece and Turkey, but tsar Boris was consistent in his relationships with Germany and rejected the proposal. On March 1 1941, Bulgaria officially joined the Axis and the German troops entered Bulgaria to prepare to invade Greece. During 1941-1944, Bulgarian army occupied parts of Greece and Yugoslavia. Tsar Boris proclaimed war on USA and Britain, but refused to follow the example of Romania and to send Bulgarian soldiers to the Eastern front, in spite of the aerial attacks of USSR, USA and Great Britain. In 1943, various political forces of Bulgaria create the Fatherland Front, an anti-fascist resistance organization. In spring and summer of 1944, USSR some times offers the Bulgarian government to quit the alliance with Germany, but tsar Boris refuses to. Despite the persecutions, the Fatherland Front grew and by September 1944, included more than 30,000 people. On August 23, Romania officially quit the Axis block and allowed the Soviet troops to come to the borders of Bulgaria. Since August 26, the Fatherland Front begins armed rebellion in many parts of the country. Boris appoints a new prime-minister and proclaims neutrality, but continues support to the German army and then prohibits the Fatherland Front. For this reason, the Soviet Union proclaims war to Bulgaria. On September 9, the FF begins uprisal in Sofia, arrests members of the government and the royal family, establishes new government and takes power in various cities of Bulgaria. The army joins the insurgents. The Soviet army entered Bulgaria on September 8. Before the army crossed the borders, political commissars told the soldiers about the political situation in Bulgaria and about the historical ties and friendship between Bulgaria and Russia. The army marched across the country almost without a single shot, welcomed by the people. After this revolution, more than 300,000 Bulgarians fought against German and Italian fascists in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria. 32,000 of them were killed or missing in action. In 1946, the Bulgarian Communist Party took control over the Fatherland Front. The FF continued to exist till 1989 as a purely communist organization.

Russian history 37: Events in the Southern Rus. Knyaz Daniil Galitsky

In 1240, Batu Khan sacked Kiev, Volyn and Galich. In those years, there were feuds in these cities. Knyaz Roman, who united Volyn and Galich and died in 1205, had two children: Daniil and Vasilko. Only after a twenty-five years long struggle with neighbor knyazes and boyars, Daniil became a knyaz of Galich and Kiev. (He even had to escape with his mother, nanny and a monk to Poland and then to Hungary. They got assistance there and managed to return to Rus. For many years, Volyn and Galich were contested by Russian knyazes, Poles and Hungarians.)

As soon as Daniil finally broke the resistance of the boyars, Batu Khan came to his lands and Daniil had to flee again to Poland. He returned only the Mongols left. To restore the sacked cities, he invited the settlers from other countries: Poland, Germany, Hungary. Accepting the dominance of the Mongols, he took steps to the liberation from their power. He established relations with the West, sent emissaries to the Pope, promising him to unite the Orthodox and the Catholic churches, and planned a crusade against the Mongols. The Pope sent him a king's crown and in 1255 Daniil was crowned as a king in Drogichin. However, the crusade failed and Daniil got almost no assistance from the West. Daniil broke the relations with the Pope and found another ally — the Lithuanian prince Mindaugas. At this time, the Mongols began to suspect that he is plotting against them and sent an army demanding to destroy his new fortresses. Not daring to oppose the enemy, Daniil agreed.

Daniil often interfered the affairs in Hungary, Czechia, Austria and Poland, he had relatives in many European countries, encouraged trade with the West and welcomed foreigners in his lands. These relations were a logical corollary of the geographic location of his country, on the edge of Rus, near with Poland and Hungary. These relations became a reason of the loss of independence of Galich and Volyn after Daniil's death.

Like other western Russian regions, the duchy of Daniil was often attacked by Lithuanians. Daniil was in the permanent conflict with Mindaugas and the Lithuanian tribe of Yatvyags. While the weak knyazes in the North gave up, Daniil attacked himself and overran his enemy. Finally, Yatvyags had to pay tribute to the knyaz of Galich. Mindaugas offered Daniil to marry their children. Daniil's son, Shvarn, married Mindaugas' daughter and Daniil got strong influence in the duchy of Lithuania. This influence grew even larger after the death of Mindaugas, when the army of Shvarn established order in Lithuania and assisted Mindaugas' son, Voishelk.

In 1264, Daniil died. By this time, the feuds in the south-western Rus were stopped, the power of the knyaz strengthened, the wealth of the duchy grew. Rus became influential in the affairs in the Middle Europe, Lithuania was pacified. The dominance of the Mongols was weaker here, probably, because this duchy was the most distant from the Mongolian lands. However, the heirs of Daniil were incapable of keeping this prosperity. The knyazes of Galich and Volyn after Daniil, his sons, nephews and grandsons were constantly fighting with each other, boyars restored their privileges, citizens, many of whom were foreigners, demonstrated no patriotism. Foreign countries began to interfere the affairs of south-western Rus. Lithuania became so strong by the XIV century that attempted to conquer the south-western Rus. The Lithuanian princes succeded in capturing Volyn in mid-XIV century. At the same time, Poland seized Galich. So, the heritage of Daniil of Galich was lost.

Russian history 36: Events in the Northern Rus. Knyaz Alexander Nevsky.

After knyaz Yuri Vsevolodovich, who died during the battle on river Syt', his brother Yaroslav Vsevolodovich becomes the new grand knyaz in 1238. When the Mongols left to the South, he begins restoration of the burned cities. Having no power to oppose the Mongols, he accepted the domination of the Khan and went to the Golden Horde to Batu Khan. From there he had to go to Mongolia to the Great Khan, where he died in 1246. After hes death he was succeeded first by his brother and then by his sons.

The most outstanding of them was Alexander, called Nevsky. When his father was still alive, Alexander was the knyaz in Novgorod, when the Novgorod lands were attacked by Swedes, Germans and Lithuanians. Alexander managed to defeat them all. First, the Swedish prince Birger, who led his army to Finland against the Finnish pagans, decided in 1240 to invade Novgorod. The Swedes were on river Neva, near its confluence with river Izhora, when Alexander attacked them with a small druzhina and forced them to flee. This decisive victory was important as a victory of Orthodoxy over Catholicism. Many legends appeared about the battle. One of them said that saint Boris and Gleb (see chapter 16) came to assist Alexander and that they appeared to a soldier named Pelgus. After this battle, Alexander got his name Nevsky (=of Neva). A year later, Teutonic knights captured Izborsk and Pskov, invaded Vodskya fifth and robbed merchants in 40 kilometres from Novgorod. Alexander was not in Novgorod during these events. When he arrived, he took the occupied cities back and met the main forces of the Germans on the ice of Chudskoye lake on April 5, 1242. The knights were totally defeated in this battle. 50 knights were captured and brought to Pskov. After this battle, the Teutonic knights left Russian lands for a long time. (see April 5 in Russian History for more.) Three more years later, Lithuanians were forced by the Teutonic knights to move eastwards, to the lands of Polotsk and Novgorod. Having lost some battles to Alexander, they had to leave Russia.

When Yaroslav died, Alexander became the grand knyaz of Vladimir. Now, he had to deal with the Mongols. Understanding clearly that his forces are not enough to oppose the Mongols, he asked and even forced the people to pay the tribute. When Russians rebelled, Alexander had to go to the horde and to ask the khan to forgive the rebels. During one such trip, Alexander died in autumn, 1263.

He was succeeded by his brothers, Yaroslav and Vasily, whose power was weaker. Other knyazes refused to comply with their orders and even opposed them. During the next generations of the knyazes, the feuds became commonplace, and the appanage system formed in Suzdal Rus. In this system, all principalities of Suzdal Rus became the private property of the princes who owned them and their families. Principalities were now inherited and split in parts in accordance with the number of the heirs. Even the knyazes who got yarlyk from the Khan and became grand knyazes, ruled Vladimir from their home domains. Nevsky's brothers, Yaroslav and Vasily were the first knyazes to follow this new tradition. They stayed in their towns — Tver and Kostroma correspondingly. For this reason the grand knyazes of this period are usually called by their appanage towns: Yaroslav Tverskoy (of Tver), Vasily Kostromskoy (of Kostroma), Dimitri Pereyaslavsky (of Pereyaslavl), Andrei Gorodetsky (of Gorodets), etc.

The principalities of Suzdal and Vladimir Rus became appanages for three reasons. First, the knyazes of the Suzdal duchy did not have to compete with the veches, their power was strong enough. Since the earliest times, the knyazes used to be the owners of all their land. Second, the more numerous were the knyazes among the successors of Vsevolod the Big Nest, the more difficult it was for the grand knyaz of Vladimir to make them obey. They often united against the grand knyaz to keep their independence. They plotted and even fought against the grand knyaz. Third, the order of succession in Suzdal and Vladimir got some specific features. Whoever became the grand knyaz, all other knyazes retained their domains. Only the grand knyaz adjoined Vladimir to his own lands. As the number of the knyazes grew, families got their own grand knyazes. There were grand knyazes of Tver, Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, but all of them dreamed of becoming the grand knyaz of Vladimir and, hence, of all Rus.

Since the number of the appanages grew, they became smaller and their lords grew poorer. As the result, they grew more and more eager of getting a piece of their neighbor's land. The tended to view each other as competitors and even enemies. This led to the political disorder and decay of the state. This situation began to change only when the popular movement towards the unification began in Suzdal Rus and a knyazes family strong enough to lead this movement appeared in Moscow.